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We examine speculative attacks in a controlled laboratory environment featuring continuous 
time, size asymmetries, and varying amounts of public information. Attacks succeeded in 233 
of 344 possible cases. When speculators have symmetric size and access to information: (a) 
weaker fundamentals increase the likelihood of successful speculative attacks and hasten their 
onset, and (b) contrary to some theory, success is enhanced by public access to information 
about either the net speculative position or the fundamentals. The presence of a larger 
speculator further enhances success, and experience with large speculators increases small 
speculators’ response to the public information. However, giving the large speculator 
increased size or better information does not significantly strengthen his impact. 
JEL Code: F30, C73, C92. 
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1.   Introduction 
For more than 30 years, recurrent currency crises have confounded policy makers, and have 
challenged economic theorists to find explanations. The “First Generation” models, (e.g., 
Krugman, 1979, and Flood and Garber, 1984) gave insight into the Latin American and other 
crises of the 1970s and early 1980s, but had difficulty accounting for later events such as the 
1992 British Pound crisis. Theorists responded with “Second Generation” models of self-
fulfilling crises (e.g., Obstfeld, 1995, 1996), leading to quite different policy implications. The 
1997-8 crisis in East Asia and other recent events inspired “Third Generation” models that focus 
on financial market imperfections. Most Second and Third Generation models feature strategic 
interactions among speculators and government agencies, and many have multiple equilibria.  
International finance economists now have an embarrassment of riches. With so many 
models to choose from, it is hard to trust the policy implications of any one of them; indeed, the 
next currency crisis might inspire Fourth Generation models with still different implications. 
Empirical work is essential to understand the range of applicability of current models. 
Traditional econometric methods help, but are limited by a mismatch between data and theory.  
Key variables, such as speculators’ information and expectations, are not observable in the field 
so inferences are limited. The historical data, of course, can exhibit at most one equilibrium at a 
time, so the existence of multiple equilibria remains a matter of conjecture.  
The laboratory offers an underexploited source of data for examining the robustness of 
theoretical predictions. In the lab, one can observe and even control key variables including the 
information available to players, can replicate a given scenario many times, and can make 
rigorous causal inferences. Of course, laboratory markets are much smaller scale than in the 
field, and one must investigate external validity. Due to their very different strengths, laboratory 
and field data are complements, not substitutes. 
The present paper describes one of the first laboratory investigations of speculative 
attacks. The laboratory game is not closely tailored to any particular theoretical model. It is 
intended to provide evidence not otherwise obtainable that can help sharpen the issues, inform 
econometric analysis of field data, and refine existing models.  
Unlike most current models and experiments, time is continuous in our laboratory game. 
During each trial, the strength of fundamentals can deteriorate moment by moment, and the 






asynchronous decisions by human subjects illuminate aspects of the coordination problem that 
are invisible in static models, but that may be crucial in the decentralized 24 hour global foreign 
exchange market.  
The experiment focuses on a question central to many of the Second and Third 
Generation models: when can speculators coordinate on their preferred equilibrium, an attack 
that forces devaluation? The question is particularly acute when the speculators are uncertain 
about the strength of fundamentals, or are uncertain about what the other speculators are doing. 
We examine whether public information about the fundamentals and about other players’ choices 
affects coordination and, hence, the probability of a successful attack.  
In some trials we include one speculator able to take a larger position and sometimes with 
better information on the fundamentals. It is widely believed that a single large player, George 
Soros, was essential in coordinating the successful 1992 attack on British pound, and a branch of 
the theoretical literature justifies that belief. The experiment also examines some predictions 
from that theoretical literature. 
Section 2 surveys some relevant theoretical models, some field evidence, and the handful 
of relevant laboratory studies. Section 3 offers some simple theoretical perspectives and some 
theoretical predictions that are testable in the laboratory. Section 4 describes our laboratory 
environment and treatments.   
Section 5 presents the results. When feasible, attacks succeed more often than not. With 
speculators of symmetric size and access to information, speculative attacks are more often 
successful and occur sooner when fundamentals are weaker. Contrary to some theory, public 
access to information about either the net speculative position or the fundamentals also enhances 
success. The presence of a larger speculator further enhances success, and experience with large 
speculators increases small speculators’ response to the public information. However, giving the 
large speculator increased size or better information does not significantly strengthen his impact. 
Section 6 puts the findings into broader perspective.  
 
2.   Some Related Literature 
As just noted, there are already several generations of models designed to explain foreign 
currency crises.  Henderson and Salant (1978) is an important precursor, dealing with the 






formulated by Krugman (1979) and Flood and Garber (1984), focused on economies where the 
fundamentals are inconsistent with preserving a fixed exchange rate. This is the case when a 
sizable fiscal deficit is monetized and the money supply increases faster than money demand 
under a fixed exchange rate, inducing a crisis.  In the absence of uncertainty, the crisis hits and 
the currency devalues when the shadow exchange rate (i.e., the exchange rate that would prevail 
if the exchange rate were allowed to float) is equal to the official exchange rate.   
The First Generation models provide a useful interpretation of crises triggered by fiscal 
weaknesses, as in Latin America in the 1970s-80s.  However, the financial instability in Europe 
in the early 1990s, including the 1992 attack on the British Pound, shifted attention to the 
fragility of equilibrium under a fixed exchange rate.  The role of financier George Soros in the 
1992 attack also raised questions regarding speculators’ behavior when some of them have 
market power. “Second Generation” models, formulated by Obstfeld (1995, 1996), feature self-
fulfilling crises and multiple equilibria.  Obstfeld (1995), for instance, extends the Barro-Gordon 
framework and models a policy maker who faces a trade-off between credibility and flexibility 
when devaluation entails a fixed cost.  The potential for self-fulfilling crises stems from 
circularity: the behavior of the policy maker depends on prior private sector expectations of 
inflation and depreciation.  These expectations, however, depend on market perceptions of the 
policy maker’s behavior.  In such circumstances, an increase in the cost of abandoning the peg 
may increase the likelihood of a crisis [Flood and Marion (1999)], and toughness can be 
counterproductive [Drazen and Masson (1994)].   
Later events, especially the 1997-8 crisis in East Asia, led to “Third Generation” models.  
Their focus is the role of balance sheet factors and financial sector weaknesses, as well as the 
possibility of bailouts by international financial institutions, central banks, and governments. 
Leading examples include Krugman (1999), Corsetti et al. (1999), Chang and Velasco (1999) 
and Dooley (1997). 
The growing dynasty of models attests to the rich interplay between economic theory and 
economic events.  The downside is that models seem to “chase” the last crisis in an attempt to 
provide ex-post explanations. Of course, the research has also identified some ex-ante 
vulnerabilities and suggested ways to prevent or mitigate crises; see e.g. Obstfeld (1998).    
A common thread of the Second and Third Generation models is the role of public 






by introducing private information via the global games approach of Carlsson and Van Damme 
(1993). When privately informed speculators make simultaneous choices, one obtains a unique 
equilibrium for almost every value of the fundamentals. Much of the subsequent theoretical 
literature investigates when private information does or does not eliminate multiple equilibria 
(e.g., Angeletos and Werning, 2006).  
Several later authors, surveyed in Allegret and Cornand (2005), extend the static Morris 
and Shin model to examine policy issues. There has been a widespread consensus in the policy 
community, bolstered by theoretical models such as Heinemann and Illing (2002) and by some 
evidence such as Bannier (2004), that greater transparency (i.e., better information on 
fundamentals and perhaps on speculative behavior) will discourage speculative attacks. Using a 
slightly different model, Bannier and Heinemann (2005) confirm the consensus except in some 
circumstances when prior beliefs about fundamentals are optimistic, in which case a lesser 
degree of transparency will minimize the probability of speculative attacks. The survey finds 
other exceptions and concludes that central bank transparency has an ambiguous effect 
theoretically (and empirically).  
Noting that “the coordination problem among investors is at the heart of most second- 
and third-generation models of currency crises,” Corsetti et al. (2004) work out the theoretical 
implications of introducing a single large player into the global games approach. Their model 
predicts that the mere presence of a large player makes other (small) players more willing to join 
a speculative attack. The effect is enhanced when the small players can observe the large player’s 
position, but is not necessarily enhanced by increasing the size of the large player. In a more 
strategically symmetric model, Bannier (2005) concludes that attacks are more likely with a 
larger and less well informed large player when beliefs about fundamentals are pessimistic, but 
the reverse is true when beliefs are optimistic.   
Costain (2004) obtains bimodal outcomes (both successful and unsuccessful attacks) over 
a wide range of fundamentals when speculators choose sequentially and observe some earlier 
choices. Angeletos et al. (2007) reach a similar conclusion in a discrete time dynamic extension 
of global games where players can learn from earlier periods. For our purposes, their most 
interesting conclusion is that “equilibrium dynamics can alternate between phases of distress and 






(2003), also highlights the dynamic tension between delaying to learn more and moving quickly 
to ensure a share of the gains if an attack is successful. 
Guimaraes (2006) extends the Flood-Garber model to a continuous time setting in which 
the shadow foreign exchange rate (corresponding to fundamentals) follows Brownian motion and 
a continuum of speculators chooses at Poisson times. He obtains a unique equilibrium in which, 
other things equal, the number of attacking speculators increases in the Poisson parameter 
(proxying for smaller frictions) and in the trend deterioration in fundamentals; and decreases in 
the opportunity cost of speculating (e.g., the interest rate differential), and the uncertainty with 
which fundamentals are observed. Thus some recent work owes as much to the First Generation 
as to the later generations.  
Another theoretical approach begins with Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003). They build a 
rather complex model of bubbles and crashes in which a continuum of speculators gradually 
become aware of a negative shock to fundamentals, but don’t know how many others are already 
aware. Rochon (2006) incorporates this information process into a currency crisis model. In that 
model, the informed speculators delay attacking longer when fundamentals are stronger and 
deteriorate more slowly, and when speculators face higher opportunity costs and become 
informed more slowly.  
Evidence on the role of large players in contemporary foreign exchange markets includes 
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (1998) report that the top five trading firms account for 
31% of market share. Recent surveys of dealers (Cheung and Wong, 2000; Cheung and Chinn, 
2001; Cheung et al., 2004) indicate that trading in some currencies is dominated by a few big 
players. Respondents attribute deviation of FX rates from fundamental values mainly to “excess 
speculation” and “institutional customer or hedge fund manipulation.” Many observers agree that 
George Soros’ hedge fund, followed by other investors, precipitated devaluation of the British 
pound and Italian lira in the 1992 EMS crisis. Some argue that the hedge funds led the way in the 
rapid devaluation of the Japanese yen in late 1998. It would seem that their high degree of 
leverage allows hedge funds to influence the price of thinly traded currencies (Economist, 
October 10, 1998; Sesit and Pacelle, 1998). On the other hand, Eichengreen et al. (1998) and 
others argue that hedge funds did not exacerbate the 1997-8 Asian currency crises.  
We are aware of only a few relevant laboratory experiments. The first, reported in 






of Morris and Shin (1998). Subjects play the role of speculators in a series of simultaneous move 
coordination games, with public or private information about the strength of fundamentals. 
Contrary to the key global games prediction that private information resolves multiplicity, the 
speculators coordinate more successfully and achieve higher payoffs with public information. 
Consistent with the basic comparative static predictions, speculative attacks succeed more often 
when fundamentals are weaker and when speculation costs are lower.  
A second study by Costain, Heinemann and Ockenfels (2005, henceforth CHO) reports 
bimodal outcomes when traders move sequentially, as predicted in the Costain (2004) model. 
Cornand (2006) extends the static HNO setup and finds that speculative attacks succeed more 
often with two public signals than with one public and one private signal. Arikawa et al. (2006) 
also extend HNO and find, consistent with Corsetti et al. (2004), that small players are more 
likely to attack when a large player is present.  
Do similar results hold in continuous time? Huberman and Glance (1993) argue that 
continuous time can make coordination more difficult because choices are asynchronous—it’s 
not only what you do but when you do it. In the only other continuous coordination laboratory 
game we know, Brunnermeier and Morgan (2004, henceforth BM)
 1 examine “clock games” that 
end when the third of six players exits, and those three players receive a payoff that increases 
continuously in the exit time. The authors report that, consistent with the unique symmetric pure 
strategy Nash equilibrium, players exit sooner when they have better information about other 
players’ choices and clock settings.  
   
3. Theoretical  Considerations 
This section spotlights the main issues by describing speculators’ activities and writing down a 
simple stylized model. It then poses a set of researchable questions. 
When speculators think that monetary authorities may not be able to maintain a fixed 
exchange rate for some specific currency (against, say, the US Dollar), they can “attack” by 
selling the currency short, hoping to profit from the difference between the exchange rate before 
and after devaluation. Devaluation occurs when in aggregate speculators’ net short position 
exceeds some critical level that represents the monetary authorities’ willingness and ability to 
                                                 
1 We believe that all the laboratory studies mentioned here were independently initiated at about the same time as (or 






defend the currency (the so-called “fundamentals”). While waiting for devaluation, the 
speculators incur ongoing costs. The main explicit cost is the interest rate differential: authorities 
often defend a currency by raising the interest rate hundreds or even thousands of basis points 
above the US dollar rate. The main implicit cost is the risk that the authorities might impose 
capital controls, or might otherwise penalize speculators taking large short positions.  
 
3.1    A Simple Model 
Many of the strategic issues are captured in the following continuous time coordination 
game. At each moment t in [0, 1], each player i with mass (or position size) mi can switch 
between passive mode, denoted ai(t) = 0, and attack mode ai(t) = 1.
2 Let B(t) = ∑i ai(t) mi be the 
total mass of players in attack mode at time t, and let T(t) represent the threshold mass, i.e., the 
exogenous strength of fundamentals. Normalize payoff flows so that players earn 100 per unit 
time in passive mode (an opportunity cost that represents the speculators’ ongoing costs noted 
above) and, when   B(t) < T(t), earn 0 in attack mode. Let t* = min{1, inf {t: B(t) ≥ T(t) }} 
represent the moment that the speculative attack succeeds, or the end of the period if the attack 
never succeeds. The attackers receive a lump-sum payoff of L>0 when the attack succeeds. After 
that point, all players earn the opportunity cost. Set the discount factor to 1 for simplicity.  
  Thus, using the Heaviside function θ(x) = 1 if x >0 and θ(x) = 0 otherwise, the payoff for 
player i can be written as 
*
0 100(1 ( ) ) (1- *) ( *)
t
ii atd t t at L θ −+ ∫ . In the simplest variant of the game, 
players at time t observe the history T(s) and B(s) for all s<t, and all have equal mass normalized 
to unity, mi = 1. More complicated variants allow for noisy observations of T(s) and B(s) and for 
size asymmetries. 
  Some caveats are in order before discussing the equilibria of these games and the testable 
implications. The threshold T(t) is exogenous, i.e., the monetary authority is not a strategic 
participant, in order to keep a sharp focus on coordination and information issues. The games 
suppress two margins that sometimes play a minor role in the literature: the size of the 
devaluation is fixed at L, and each player either attacks fully or not at all. 
At any fixed time t, the (static) equilibrium correspondence depends on the strength of 
the fundamentals T(t)  relative to the mass m = maxi mi of the largest individual player, and to the 
                                                 






total mass M = ∑i mi of all players. When T(t) ≤ m, there are only devaluation equilibria in which 
a sufficiently large player unilaterally forces devaluation. When T(t)  > M, there is only the 
trivial equilibrium with everyone passive. Our focus is the intermediate case. When                    
m < T(t) ≤ M, there are devaluation equilibria as well as the trivial equilibrium. The question then 
is, when will the players be able to coordinate an attack to achieve the higher payoffs in a 
devaluation equilibrium?  
Continuous time introduces some interesting complications. Player i would find it in her 
immediate interest to join a speculative attack whenever she is pivotal, i.e., at any time t such 
that B(t) < T(t) ≤ B
+i(t) ≡  mi + ∑j ≠ i aj(t) mj. Typically several passive players would find 
themselves as pivotal at the same time, so they play a preemption game: as with patrons of a 
burning nightclub or depositors in a bank run, the reward goes to those who move first. The 
incentives are in the opposite direction when a player is not pivotal. It is in her interest to wait for 
the other players to attack (and let them forego the opportunity cost of 100 per unit time) until 
she becomes pivotal. Thus the direct incentive switches abruptly from free riding (waiting) to 
preemption (rushing) when a player becomes pivotal.
3 
The efficient equilibrium in the continuous time game (from the players’ perspective, not 
the Central Bank’s perspective!)  is for all players to switch simultaneously into attack mode at 
the first time t* that T(t*) ≤ M. Of course, there are many other equilibria, e.g., “sunspot” 
equilibria in which a sufficient mass of players attacks at an arbitrary t* such that T(t*) ≤ M.  
 
3.2   Researchable Questions 
In practice, one wonders how the players might learn to coordinate on any equilibrium. 
Some of our evidence suggests a home-grown signaling process. When B(s) is publicly 
observable, a player switching into attack mode signals to the other players currently in passive 
mode that they are now closer to being pivotal, which may encourage them also to switch. This 
signal is low cost if the switch is brief. Such signaling episodes would be observed as pulses in 
                                                                                                                                                             
measurable. 
3 Similar timing issues arise in several other contexts besides speculative attacks. These range from trying to be 
fashionably late to a dinner party, to introducing a new high technology product or harvesting a seasonal crop, to 
selling off a bubble asset. Park and Smith (2008) consider such games with no information on other players’ choices 
and no option to switch back to non-speculative mode. They derive symmetric mixed Nash equilibria characterized 
by a trickle of attackers until a crucial moment (determined by the known future path T(t+s)) when all remaining 






which B increases rapidly and either reaches the threshold T so the attack succeeds, or else tops 
out below T and then rapidly declines. Angeletos et al. (2007) obtain such pulses in dynamic 
equilibrium. 
The interesting questions now may be posed as follows.  
1. Fundamentals. Is the probability of a successful attack a decreasing function of T(t)? The 
static Nash equilibrium correspondence allows for that possibility but does not require it. Recall 
that the global games approach predicts a sharp transition from probability 0 to probability 1. To 
expand slightly on the comments at the end of the previous section, HNO obtain a more gradual 
transition using different fixed levels of T in different trials, while CHO confirm an almost linear 
transition with simultaneous choice but persistent bimodality with sequential choice. By contrast, 
our laboratory design will allow us to evaluate the effects of continuously changing 
fundamentals.   
2. Information. Does the probability of a successful attack increase or decrease when players 
have better public information about B and T?  The discussion above (regarding signaling and 
being pivotal) suggests an increase, as do the lab results (albeit in a very different context) of 
BM. The policy consensus, together with some theory and field evidence, predicts a decrease. 
Bannier and Heinemann (2005) predict that it can go either way depending on market sentiment 
and other factors. In a somewhat different lab context, HNO find that public information makes 
no significant difference. 
3. Asymmetries. Does the presence of a player with larger mass or better information increase the 
probability of a successful attack? Corsetti et al. (2004) predict affirmative answers that are 
consistent with the laboratory results of Arikawa et al. (2006). Bannier (2005) has more nuanced 
predictions. Our experiment provides evidence in a continuous time setting. 
4. Coordination. In terms of individual choice, do players respond differently when they are 
nearly pivotal than when they are far from pivotal? More precisely, is a player in passive (or 
active) mode more (or less) likely to switch when the shortfall T(t) - B
+i(t) is smaller? More 
generally, is the switch probability increasing in B and/or decreasing in T? 
 
4. The Experiment  
To answer such questions, we conducted an experiment at UCSC’s LEEPS lab using a custom-






choice games. A typical session lasted 90 minutes and involved fewer than a dozen 
inexperienced human subjects recruited by email from a campus-wide pool of undergraduate 
volunteers.  Subjects silently read the instructions, reproduced in Appendix A, and then listened 
to an oral summary by the conductor. After a quiz and a couple of practice rounds, they played 
usually played 45 periods, of which most were the Speculative Attack game described in more 
detail below. Each subject received $2 (or $3 in some sessions) in cash per 1000 points earned 
over all periods, plus a $5 showup fee. On average the cash payment was $20.90, and the vast 
majority of subjects earned between $15 and $30. 
  During each period, each subject privately viewed a player screen display similar to the 
one shown in Figure 1. Except for one condition (explained in the Symmetry item below), each 



































Each subject had two buttons, labeled Red (corresponding to the passive mode) and Blue 
(the attack mode), and switched mode by clicking the button not grayed out. In Speculative 
Attack periods, the payoff rates were exactly as in the theoretical discussion above: 0 for Blue 
prior to success, and 100 per period for Red (the opportunity cost) and for either mode after a 
successful attack. It was announced publicly (and written on the whiteboard) that players in Blue 
mode at the time that an attack succeeded received a bonus of L=100 points. The “Activity 
Payoff Graph” portion of the screen showed in real time the payoff rates as blue and red lines, 
and also showed (as a green area) the player’s profits earned so far. At the end of each period, 
the subject could see her current period and previous period payoffs, and the average payoffs to 
both activities, as in the right side panels in Figure 1. 
Continuously updated panels as in the upper left in Figure 1 allowed players in the 
baseline treatment to observe the mass B(s) of players in attack mode and the threshold T(s) for 
success, for all times s from the beginning of the period up to the current time t. More precisely, 
the program refreshed the screen displays every “tick”, set at half a second (500 msec), and each 
period lasted 90 seconds. 
 
4.1 Treatments 
Table 1 lists the 12 experimental sessions featuring Speculative Attack periods. Each 
session had several blocks, each with four consecutive periods of the Speculative Attack game 
separated from the adjoining blocks by single periods of some other game using the same 
computer interface. Each block held constant all treatments except the time path of 
fundamentals; the other treatments varied across blocks and across sessions. The table includes 
90 such blocks, but excludes 16 periods with too-strong fundamentals (as described below); 
hence the table and subsequent analysis reports 4*90 – 16 = 344 periods. 
Key treatments include the following. 
1. Number of players and experience. The number of human subjects varied across sessions from 
4 to 11, and was known to everyone. The last two sessions used only subjects with experience in 
a prior session of the experiment; the other sessions used only inexperienced subjects. 
2. Fundamentals. The threshold T(t) always started out at 110% of total player mass M at t=0, 






































   =1  =3  =5   T  B  TB  A D N  yes  no   
85 7/21/04  15  0 06   10 11 800  02 13 No 
86 8/16/04  36  0 04   24 24 1 600  08 28 No 
87 8/18/04  23  0 06   19 16 1 200  05 18 No 
88 9/28/04  36  0 07   24 24 1 600  08 28 No 
89 10/6/04  18  0 05   10 10 600  04 14 No 
91 10/13/04  18  0 08   10 10 600  04 14 No 
94 11/19/04  0  31 06   18 31 18 6 18 7 4 27 No 
100 1/25/05  11  10 12 7  13 33 1 386  80 33 No 
101 1/31/05 8  9 11 11  13 28 1 377  60 28 No 
102 2/1/05 9  12 14 8  15 19 999  85 30 No 
103 2/7/05 7  12 87   11 18 877  63 24 Yes 
104 2/8/05  12  14 18 9  17 25 10 11 10 11 5 39 Yes 
Sum  
193  88 63   184 249 1 3 54 85 7  4 648 296
 
 
Note: The table and subsequent analysis excludes practice periods, the first 5 periods in each session, periods not related to speculative 
attacks, and 16 periods in which the attack was not feasible. The sessions after 10/13/04 include only the extreme information treatments 
(sharp lines or none) regarding fundamentals and speculative activity, while the prior sessions also include the intermediate (thick line) 
treatments. 
a  Symmetric periods are indicated by max player weight =1, regular Soros periods by =3 and BigSoros periods by =5.
 
b  T indicates that the threshold line is displayed; B indicates that the blue (attack) line is displayed; and TB indicates that both lines are 
displayed. 
 c A indicates that only Soros sees the threshold line; D indicates that all players see the threshold line; and N indicates that no players 
see the threshold line in sessions with asymmetric (“Soros”) periods. 







 value for the rest of the period.
4 Final values and times ranged from 50% of M at 15 seconds to 
105% at 60 seconds. Of course, attacks cannot succeed when T(t) always remains above 100%, 
and the 16 such periods are excluded from the analysis.
5 The vast majority of fundamentals paths 
lie between a decrease to 90% of M within 45 seconds, and a decrease to 60% within 30 seconds. 
The path changed each period (to discourage uninteresting focal point equilibria), and varied 
across blocks orthogonally to the other treatment variables (to sharpen statistical inferences). 
3. Information. The threshold line T(t) and blue activity line B(t) were displayed sharply in 
baseline periods, as in Figure 1. In some other periods, participants saw a thick line or band 
encompassing (not centered on) the actual value; its width allowed observational errors of up to 
two players.  In some periods we completely suppressed either the T line or the B line. Thus each 
source of information had three possible levels, yielding 3*3=9 different information treatments. 
Preliminary analysis showed that performance in the thick line treatments was not significantly 
different from the sharp line treatments, so the main data analysis involves only 2*2  = 4 distinct 
information treatments. 
4. Symmetry. In more than half of the reported periods, all players had the same screen displays 
and the same weight. In three periods of most blocks of some sessions, one player (called Soros 
below) had weight 3 or 5 times the weight of the other players. Soros observed the same B line as 
everyone else (either perfect or none), but in some blocks when other players did not observe T, 
Soros observed it perfectly, and this possibility was known to all players. The Soros role rotated 
among the players across blocks. Each player knew when Soros was present, could infer Soros’ 
size in periods when the B line appeared, and knew when she had the Soros role.  
The laboratory environment is constructed to address the questions posed at the end of 
the previous section, regarding the impact of fundamentals, information, player asymmetries and 
pivotality. It does not address some other questions covered in the HNO experiment, such as the 
comparative statics of devaluation size and opportunity cost, or the general impact of private 
information (we examine only Soros’ private information). The sequential environment of CHO 
and the continuous time environment of BM allow players only to switch once from passive to 
                                                 
4 This treatment of fundamentals is perhaps reminiscent of First Generation models, except that (due to our focus on 
the “intermediate case”) we always stabilize T above the level m where the no-attack equilibrium disappears.   
5 Of course, we excluded the block separation periods from the present paper, as well as periods from early pilot 
sessions (in which we often varied the number of active players within a session and introduced some automated 
agents). We also excluded the first block of each session because occasionally a few subjects seemed confused in the 










attack mode; ours allows them to switch freely back and forth. Thus our asynchronous 
environment provides a new and stringent test of coordination. 
 
5. Results 
5.1  Overview 
Before testing hypotheses, we gain perspective by examining how players behaved in a 
single trading period, say the 19
th period in the last session. In that block (periods 16-20), all 
players observed neither the blue line B(t), the weight of players in attack mode, nor the gray line 
T(t), the threshold weight or strength of fundamentals.  In period 19, player #4 had the Soros 















Figure 2. Player activity graph from period 19 on Feb. 8, 2005. The threshold (grey line) falls to 
0.5 (6.5) after 45 seconds. There were 9 human players, but player 4 had a weight of 5 in this 
period. No player saw any of the lines in this period.  
 
 
As shown in Figure 2, the threshold dropped from 110% of total mass M ( = 5+8*1 = 13) 
to 50% of M at t=45 seconds. In the first 20 seconds or so players remained in passive mode 
except for brief solo attacks by player #5 and player #4 (Soros). Then several small players 
successively switched into attack mode and remained there for several seconds, but the attack 
reached a plateau and began to subside by t=27 sec. At t=41, with much weaker fundamentals, 
the attack was renewed and it succeeded at t*=45.5 when Soros finally switched to attack mode. 
Soros and the other attackers at t* earned about 190 points each in period 19, while passive 
players earned 100 points. Player #9 abandoned the attack just before it succeeded and earned 
Blue line 
Red line 






only 89 points. 
  The other 343 periods differed in many respects. Some sessions saw many periods with 
several unsuccessful attack pulses, while other sessions (including the last) usually saw attacks 
succeed on the first pulse. Some sessions had relatively few successful attacks, but in one session 
attacks usually succeeded almost as soon as they became feasible. Summaries for all periods in 
Figure 2 format cannot be included here but are available on request. 
 
 
Figure 3: Success Rates for Speculative Attacks by the Strength of Fundamentals in Symmetric Periods. 
The success rate at threshold x is defined as S(x)/[S(x)+U(x)], where S(x) = number of periods where an 
attack succeeded at a threshold at or above x, and U(x) = number of periods where the threshold declined 
to x without a successful attack. The horizontal axis is the threshold T as a fraction of the mass M of 
players. The treatment dummies DB and DT =1 (resp. =0) indicate that players observe (resp. do not 
observe) the number of attackers and the threshold. 
 
Figure 3 provides an overview of speculative success for the 296 symmetric periods, by 
information condition. The success rate for speculative attacks is, of course, zero when the 
































T = 0.95M, and the figure shows that the success rate in this case is under 10% in all information 
treatments.  When speculators can see both B(t) and T(t), the success rate climbs steeply as 
fundamentals weaken, e.g., it is over 70% when T = 0.75M , that is, when ¾ of the speculators 
are required. By contrast, the success rate at the same threshold is only about 20% when 
speculators see neither B(t) nor T(t). Players achieve intermediate success rates when they can 
see one but not both of the lines.  
The figure suggests affirmative answers to the first two research questions: the 
probability of a successful attack does seem to be a decreasing function of the threshold, and 
seems enhanced by more public information. But the figure doesn’t indicate whether the 
differences are significant, it conflates rapidly moving with slowly moving fundamentals, and it 
omits the asymmetric periods.
6 More quantitative tests are in order. 
 
5.2 Performance Variables, Explanatory Variables, and Estimation Techniques 
The first two parts of our quantitative data analysis treat each period as a single 
observation, and examine four measures of performance. 
1. Success: this dummy variable =1 iff there is a successful attack that period.  
2. Time to success, τ =t*-to: seconds elapsed from the time to when the attack first became 
feasible (so T(to) = M) until the time t* when the attack succeeded. Since time-dependent 
variables are recorded by tick (half-seconds), we can also measure time as the integer number of 
ticks instead of the decimal number τ of seconds. The τ and tick variables are right-censored by 
the end of the period when t*=90, i.e., when no attack succeeds that period. 
3. Minimum gap, Mingap = min{T(t) – B(t): 0 ≤ t ≤ 90}/M, the minimum shortfall of the mass 
attackers from the threshold within the period, expressed as a fraction of player mass M. Mingap 
measures continuously how close attacks come to success. It equals zero and is left-censored 
when Success = 1.  
                                                 
6 After making conventions on how to classify periods in which Soros sees T but other players do not, etc., one can 
create versions of Figure 3 that includes the asymmetric periods. The results are roughly similar to Figure 3 except 
that the DB=1, DT=0 line is closer to the full information line DT=DB=1, suggesting that information on 










dt t B :  the area under the blue activity line B(t) before the attack succeeds. It 
measures speculators’ foregone earnings due to attacks before achieving success. It is right-
censored when Success = 0.  
The explanatory variables (as previously noted in Table 1 and Figure 3) include: 
1. Threshold information dummy: DT=1 if a threshold line is displayed (exact or with noise) and 
=0 if it is not displayed. (We found no qualitative difference between an exact DT dummy and a 
noisy DT dummy in the symmetric sessions, so we combine them.)  
2. Blue information dummy: DB=1 if the blue line is displayed (exact or with noise) and =0 if it 
is not displayed. (Again, for simplicity we combined the exact and noisy DB dummies after 
finding no qualitative difference between them.) 
3. Steep dummy: Steep=1 if T(t) fell to 0.5 within 50 seconds, or to 0.6 within 30 seconds. A 
value of 1 indicates rapid deterioration of the fundamentals. 
  To explain the first performance measure, success, we estimate the Logit model 
P(yi = 1) = F(xi’β), i = 1, …, N, 
where yi is the period i success dummy taking the value of 1 or 0, while xi is a vector of 
explanatory variables, and β is the corresponding vector of coefficients.  ) 1 /( ) (
w w e e w F + =  is 
the logistic distribution function, and N=193  is the number of periods included in the regression 
analysis.  
 Due  to  their  censoring structure, the performance variables τ, Mingap, and Bluearea are 
estimated using the Tobit specification 
yi
*  = xi’β + εi, i = 1, …, N 
where the observed variable yi is equal to its latent counterpart yi
* if there is no censoring and is 
equal to 1 (0) if yi
* is right- (left-) censored.  (For τ, the censor-value of 1 period length 
corresponds to 90 sec or 180 ticks.) The coefficients are estimated under the standard Type I 
extreme-value distribution assumption.
7  
To check robustness and to offer a different perspective on the data, we re-examine the 
time to success τ using the Cox proportional hazard model (PHM) 
hi(t) = h(t,xi) = h0(t) exp(xi' β),  i = 1, …, N. 
                                                 
7 The Type I extreme-value distribution function, also known as the log Weibull distribution function, is given by 






The variable hi(t) is the hazard rate (or, in the present context, the success rate), the probability 
density that a speculative attack is successful at time t conditional on the explanatory variables in 
the vector xi (and conditional on no earlier success, so we can use t and τ  interchangeably). The 
baseline hazard rate h0(t)  is hi(t) when xi = 0. One advantage of PHM is that it is semiparametric 
and imposes no functional form on the baseline function h0(t). 
 
5.3 Tests of Fundamentals and Information. 
Is the probability of a successful attack a decreasing function of T(t)? We now sharpen 
this first question as: do the variables T(t) or Steep have a significant impact on the performance 
variables in the appropriate direction? Likewise, the second researchable question—Does the 
probability of a successful attack increase or decrease when players have better public 
information about B and T?—can be sharpened as: do the variables DB and DT significantly 
impact the performance variables in either direction?  
Table 2 collects the evidence from the 193 periods with symmetric players. The second 
column reports the logit estimates for the performance variable Success. The probability of a 
successful attack does significantly increase when the threshold and attack mass variables are 
observable and when the fundamentals deteriorate rapidly. Indeed, a steep decline in the 
fundamentals increases the log odds of success by almost three. We also considered the effect of 
the interaction terms DT*Steep and DT*DB, but omit reporting them because neither is highly 
significant in any specification or even marginally significant in most specifications.  
The Tobit estimation results for the other three performance variables are shown in the 
next three columns, and they all reinforce the implications of the Logit estimates. For instance, 
the time to success (τ) is significantly less when players see the T and the B lines and when T 
drops steeply. Each dummy variable reduces the time to success by about 15% (e.g., 0.88 /5.87 ≈ 
0.15 for DB). Again, the estimates indicate that the 'Steep' dummy has an even larger impact. 
So far the regression results indicate that information about the fundamentals and 
speculative activity hastens the occurrence of a successful attack. What happens when no 
successful attack is observed? The Mingap Tobit regression again indicates that all three 
explanatory variables foster speculation and help narrow the gap to success. The Bluearea Tobit 
regression likewise shows that the same variables reduce the time spent in fruitless speculation. 







Table 2: Coefficient Estimates for Symmetric Periods 
 
Dependent Var.  Success  τ in sec  Mingap  Bluearea  τ in sec  Ticks  Ticks  Ticks  Ticks 
Model  Logit Tobit Tobit Tobit  PHM PHM PHM PHM  PHM 
  Intercept  -2.29 **  5.87 **  -.31 **  6.88 **           
  DT   1.61 **  -.81 **  -.32 **  - .69 **  1.08 **  1.03 **    1.04 **  1.04 ** 
  DB   1.59 **  -.88 **  -.32 **  - .87 **  1.29 **  .91 **  .62  .93 **  .92 ** 
  Steep  2.96 **  -1.33 **  -.71 **  -1.62 **    1.85 **         
    T(t)        -7.04  **  -8.89  **  -7.52  **  -7.14  ** 
AT(t)         -6.21  -3.92   
Tprime(t)            -5.00 
No.  of  obs.  193 193 193 193  193 193 66  193  193 
Censor  if  success    =0 =1 =0  =0 =0 =0 =0  =0 
Type  of  censoring    right left  right  right right right right  right 
No.  censored  obs.    87 106  87  87 87 44 87  87 
 
Note: 
** denotes p-values ≤ .001, 
* denotes p-values ≤ .01, 






(because the PHM estimates the success rate instead of the time to success) but the fitted models again 
reinforce each other. Other things equal, displaying the strength of fundamentals (DT=1) increases the 
probability of a successful attack per unit time by an estimated factor of e
1.08 ≈ 2.94, or 194%. Likewise, 
displaying the overall speculative position (DB=1) more than triples the probability of success (e
1.29 ≈ 
3.65) and steeply declining fundamentals (Steep=1) increases it sixfold (e
1.85 ≈  6.36).  
The PMH also allows us to examine directly the effect of the time-varying fundamental T(t), as 
reported in the remaining columns Table 2. Of course, the Steep dummy is now redundant and is omitted 
and, due to the way the data are recorded, the time variable is expressed in ticks rather than in seconds. In 
column 7, both information dummies DT and DB maintain their significance and approximate magnitudes 
in the presence of T(t), although their relative size changes. The coefficient estimate -7.04 implies that 
deterioration of fundamentals causes a dramatic increase in the probability of a successful attack. For 
example, the success probability doubles when T decreases by just 10% of speculators’ total capacity M 
(since e
(-0.10)*(-7.04) ≈ 2.02).   
What happens when players can’t observe the threshold, that is, when DT = 0? Define AT(t) as the 
average over all draws of T(t) used in the experiment. Up to sampling error, this variable captures an 
individual player’s previous experience in observing the fundamentals. Columns 8 and 9 report results 
based on, respectively, only sessions with DT = 0 and all the sessions. The results suggest that subjects 
respond appropriately to such experience, especially in the 66 periods with DT = 0, but (perhaps due to 
sampling error) the AT(t) coefficient estimates aren’t quite significant; their p-values are 0.37 in the DT = 
0 subset and 0.27 overall.  
Some of the theoretical work suggests that the speed at which fundamentals deteriorate is as 
important as the level (Flood and Garber, 1984; Guimares, 2006; Rochon, 2006). To investigate, we form 
the variable Tprime = dT/dt , expressed as a fraction of M  per minute. For instance, if T falls linearly 
from 1.1M to 0.8M  at t=45 sec and then stops, then Tprime = -0.3/(45/60) =  -0.4 for t < 45 sec  and  = 0 
for t > 45 sec. The results in the last column of Table 2 show that the deterioration rate of fundamentals 
has the predicted effect but it is not statistically significant. We note that if T is excluded from the 
regression, then Tprime has the expected sign and is significant. Thus, our data do not support the 
extreme view that the deterioration rate of fundamentals is all that matters.  
We also conducted several robustness checks, omitted from Table 2 to conserve space. Players in 
a given session might be especially good or bad at coordinating, and this could affect the results, so we re-
ran all regressions using session fixed effects.  None of the estimated effects changes sign or loses 






(e.g., session exp101 has a very large fixed effect for Success, suggesting excellent coordination) but, 
except for some of the Bluearea and Mingap tobits, very few are highly significant. We also ran several 
alternative PHM specifications. Including a time trend in some cases slightly increased the estimated 
magnitude and significance of the T, AT, or Tprime variables, but never enough to change the qualitative 
conclusions, and the time trend itself was never significant in the presence of these variables.  
 
5.4 Tests of Asymmetry 
  Does the presence of a player with larger mass or better information increase the probability of a 
successful attack? To address this third researchable question, we define the   following dummy 
explanatory variables: 
1. Soros: equals one if there was a player with weight>1  
2. BigSoros: equals one if his weight=5; =0 otherwise 
3. PT: equals one if the threshold line {T(s): s<t} is displayed for the Public 
4. OST: equals one if only Soros sees the threshold line, but not the Public 
Table 3 reports regressions for the asymmetric sessions, which include 47 symmetric periods as 
well as 151 periods with Soros. The specifications are similar to those in Table 2, augmented by the 
‘Soros’ variable and the more significant interactions. The variable ‘BigSoros’ is insignificant in all 
specifications and so is dropped from the reported results. One possible interpretation, consistent with the 
theoretical results of Corsetti et al. (2004), is that what matters is Soros’ mere presence, not his exact 
trading capacity. The ‘OST’ variable is also insignificant in all specifications and omitted from the table.  
The results in Table 3 confirm that Soros has a real impact. The “Soros” dummy variable is 
significant at least at the 10% level in each regression, and always indicates that speculative attacks are 
more likely to succeed and come sooner when Soros is present.  For example, the third column of Panel A 
indicates that Soros speeds the time to success by almost 30% (from 1.94/6.76 ≈ 0.287).  Even when the 
attack is not successful, the Mingap and pressure estimates in columns 4 and 5 indicate that the presence 
of Soros significantly narrows the gap from success and adds to speculative pressure.  
The impact of fundamentals T(t) is less in Table 3 than in Table 2 but is still quite strong. For 
example, the devaluation probability increase for a 10% deterioration in fundamentals is 65% (based on 
the -5.01 coefficient estimate in the last column of Table 3), about two-thirds as strong as in Table 2. 
Steeply declining fundamentals seldom appear in the asymmetric data, so the steep dummy has more 







Table 3: Coefficient Estimates for Asymmetric Sessions 
 
Dependent Var.  Success  τ in sec  Mingap  Bluearea  τ in sec  Ticks  Attack
a 
Model  Logit Tobit Tobit Tobit  PHM  PHM  PHM 
  Intercept  -5.12
 * 6.76
 ** .25
 ** 9.31 
**      
  PT   3.68
 * -1.24
 ** -.24





  DB   5.18
 * -2.42
 * -.28





  PT*DB  -1.96  .82
* -.02  1.26 
*  -1.23 
+ -.45   
  Steep  14.52  -.82
 ** -3.54      1.62 
**   1.27
 **   
  T(t) 
          -5.01
**   -2.47 
**
  Soros  3.80 
+ -1.94
 + -.22
 **  -2.39+  2.93
 * 2.42
 +      .31 
** 
  DB*Soros  -2.19  1.55
 +  -.003      2.28 +   -2.33
 + -1.73   
No.  of  obs.  198 198 198  198  198 198  2448 
Censor if success    =0  =1  =0  =0  =0   
Type of censoring    right  left  right  right  right  right 
No. censored obs.    44  154  44  44  44  282 
 
Note: 
** denotes p-values ≤ .001, 
* denotes p-values ≤ .01, 
+ denotes p-values ≤ .1.  Data in all columns 
except the last are from all periods of sessions conducted after 11/1/04 as reported in Table 1. 
aThe 
columns for Attack are based on all data from all sessions reported in Table 1.  
 
 
Table 3, like Table 2, reports that both informational dummy variables significantly increase the 
probability of an attack, hasten its onset, increase speculative pressure, and reduce the shortfall of 
unsuccessful attacks. However, in Table 3 most of the direct effects are stronger and they often interfere 
with each other. The Tobit time to success estimates, for example, indicate separate reductions of about 
18% and 36% respectively for PT (the counterpart of DT from Table 2) and DB, but an offset of 12% in 
the combination. Thus when speculators observe both speculative activity and fundamentals, the average 
time to success declines by about [1.24 + 2.42 – 0.82]/6.76 ≈ 18% + 36% - 12% = 42%.   
The interaction term DB*Soros is insignificant in many of the regressions, but comes up 
marginally significant in two of the three timing regressions, with a sign again indicating an offset of the 
level effects. Looking once more at the Tobit time to success estimates, we note that the separate effects 
are 36% and 29% reductions respectively for observing speculative activity and for Soros’ presence, but 
the coefficient estimate for DB*Soros implies an offset of 1.55/6.76 ≈ 23% and thus a combined effect of 
about 36% + 29% - 23% = 42%. In comparing these estimates to those from Table 2, the main puzzle is 
the large impact for DB (estimated at 36%) when Soros is absent. Perhaps players somehow become more 
attuned to signaling in sessions where Soros is usually present. 






generally strengthens the results slightly, without changing the qualitative results. We also tried the AT 
and Tprime variables on the asymmetric data, obtaining results a bit noisier but otherwise similar to those 
reported in the previous subsection. These additional results are not reported for brevity but are available 
from the authors. 
 
5.5 Tests of Coordination 
The last column of Table 3 investigates a preliminary question: how do individual speculators 
decide when to attack? We fit the proportional hazard model to the 2448 ticks at which a speculator first 
switched from passive mode into attack mode. The estimates indicate that such switches are much more 
likely when speculators can see the strength of fundamentals and somewhat more likely when they can 
see the amount of speculation. Stronger fundamentals (when observable) deter attacks and the presence of 
Soros encourages attacks. 
 
Table 4: Timing of Speculative Attacks 
 
  No. of obs.  Mean SP  t Test  MW Test 
Soros Knows Same      6.05** 4.44**
  Regular Players  2033  5.25    
  Soros Players  178  3.70    
        
Soros Knows More      5.78** 4.32**
  Regular Players  664  5.36    
  Soros Players  93  3.32    
 
Note: MW refers to the nonparametric Mann-Whitney (or Wilcoxon rank-sum) test, and t refers to the 
unequal variance version of Student’s t test for equality of means. The variable Shortfall from Pivotality 
(SP) is defined in the text. Data are all periods from sessions conducted after 10/13/04 reported in Table 
1. 
** denotes p-values ≤ .001. 
 
Table 4 investigates a question related both to coordination and to asymmetry. The model of 
Corsetti et al. (2004) emphasizes Soros’ ability to exploit his signaling strength by attacking earlier than 
other speculators. On the other hand, in our experiment, Soros could exploit his greater opportunity to be 
pivotal by attacking later. By the same token, ordinary speculators might attack earlier to avoid 
preemption by Soros.  
The most direct evidence comes from defining the variable Shortfall from Pivotality, SP(i,t) = T(t) 






players it would take for the attack to succeed. Table 4 reports mean values of SP of 5.25 for regular 
players and 3.70 for Soros players when Soros has no informational advantage, and reports similar 
averages (if anything, a bit further apart) when Soros knows the strength of fundamentals but small 
speculators do not.  Thus in our experiment Soros attacks later than ordinary speculators. 
  






































  Intercept  -3.04 ** 
-2.80 
-3.47 
**  -5.01 **  2.37 ** 2.77  1.33 **  1.65 
DT   0.15 **  -0.20  0.09 +  0.06  0.41 ** 0.64 **  0.37 **  0.93 * 
DB   0.24 **  -0.18  0.23 **  -0.43 +  0.21 ** 0.92 **  0.20 **  0.40 
DT*DB   1.18 **    0.76 +    -0.14    -0.97 + 





** -0.14  ** 
 
 
SP*DT     0.09 +        0.05     
SP*DB     0.13 **        -0.07 +     
SP*DT*DB  -0.29  **       -0.08    
Threshold     -0.13 
** 0.02 
   0.03  +  -0.01 
numAttack     0.33  **  0.50 **     0.23  **  0.16  + 
Thresh*DT         0.01      0.01 
Thresh*DB         0.12 *      0.01 
numAtt*DT         -0.16 *        -0.07 
numAtt*DB       -0.11  +       0.12  + 
Th*DT*DB       -0.15  *        0.02 
Att*DT*DB         0.31 **        0.17 + 
No. of obs.  109051  109051  109051  109051  27061  27061  27061  27061 
 
Note: ** denotes p-values ≤ .001, * denotes p-values ≤ .01, + denotes p-values ≤ .10.  Data include all 
ticks prior to a successful attack in all symmetric periods and for all subjects reported in Table 1. 
 
Table 5 addresses the crucial question on coordination: do players respond differently when they 
are nearly pivotal than when they are far from pivotal? The table looks at each player’s choices every 






109 thousand observations), it uses a logit model to fit the cases (about 3 thousand) where the player 
switched to attack mode on the next tick. For players already in attack mode (about 27 thousand 
observations) it fits the choice of staying in attack mode (about 25 thousand cases) or switching back to 
passive mode.  
The second column reports direct effect estimates. The presence of either line increases the 
switching probability significantly, and a greater shortfall from pivotality decreases it. The third column 
allows for individual subject fixed effects and interactions. When both lines are visible, those estimates 
give slope -.34+.09+.13-.29 =  -0.41 and intercept -2.80-.20-.18+1.18  =  -2.00. Given the logit 
specification, the corresponding switch probability is exp (-2.00 - 0.41SP) /(1+ exp(-2.00 - 0.41SP)), 
about 12% when the player is pivotal (SP=0, essentially a measure of reaction time) and about 8% when 
only one more speculator is required for a successful attack (SP=1). The estimated probability falls below 
1% when at least 7 more speculators are needed. 
These coefficient estimates indicate that seeing both lines together has a much stronger effect than 
seeing either of them by itself: for the intercept, the direct effects (-.20, -.18) are at best marginally 
significant while the interaction (+1.18) is very significant, and for the slope estimates the interaction term 
(-0.29) again is the most significant and strongest term. 
The fourth column breaks apart the SP variable and looks at the separate effects of the threshold 
T(t) and the number of players B(t) currently in attack mode, as fractions of the total player mass M.  
Consistent with many of the theoretical models, the T(t) coefficient estimate indicates that individual 
players are significantly more likely to switch to attack mode when fundamentals are weaker. Switching 
to attack mode responds even more strongly to a larger number of players already in attack mode.  The 
significant three way interactions in the fifth column once more show that seeing both lines together has 
an especially strong effect. 
The other columns of Table 5 obtain parallel results for players already in attack mode. The direct 
effect estimates for SP again indicate that players are more likely to remain in attack mode when they 
have more information and when the attack is closer to success. The more refined specification in the next 
column obtains stronger direct effect estimates but relatively weak interaction estimates. The last column 
also shows a significantly stronger positive information effect for threshold but a marginally significant 
level effect of the wrong sign.
8  
Subsets of the data provide evidence on the robustness of two conditional predictions regarding 
                                                 
8 That sign reverts to its expected one but becomes insignificant in more refined estimates including higher order interactions 






transparency. Recall that Bannier and Heinemann (2005) conclude that greater transparency may 
encourage speculation in some circumstances when speculators believe that fundamentals are strong. 
Their model, an extension of global games, doesn’t translate precisely into our laboratory setup, but if 
their conclusion is very robust it would suggest that the positive DB and DT coefficient estimates in the 
second column of Table 5 are due to observations when T(t) is high. Figure 3 points to T(t)=0.8M as a 
natural breakpoint, since the success rate of speculative attacks in the full information condition first 
exceeds 50% and climbs sharply at this threshold. Restricting to T(t) ≥ 0.8M data, we obtain coefficient 
estimates -0.06 and 0.23**, smaller than the unrestricted estimates of 0.15** and 0.24** reported in the 
table. Thus the first conditional prediction is not supported in our data. 
Recall that Bannier (2005) concludes that attacks are more likely with a larger and less well 
informed large player when beliefs about fundamentals are pessimistic, but the reverse holds when beliefs 
are optimistic. A rough translation into our data predicts higher attack rates by ordinary players in 
condition 5N-p (Soros has weight 5 and neither Soros nor regular players see the threshold line, and 
fundamentals are “pessimistic,” T(t) < 0.8M) than in 3A-p (Soros has weight 3 and is the only one who 
sees the threshold line, and T(t) < 0.8M), and higher attack rates in 3A-o than in 5N-o (defined as before 
except with “optimistic” fundamentals T(t) ≥ 0.8M). The raw attack rates in our data are 3.2% in 5N-p 
versus 7.0% in 3A-p (contrary to the first part of the prediction) and are 2.9% in 3A-o versus 2.7% in 5N-
o (consistent with the prediction but negligible). To control for information conditions and SP, one 
compares intercept coefficients the basic Switch to Attack Logit. The first comparison becomes negligible 
(log-odds of -1.70 in 5N-p versus -1.76 in 3A-p) while the second becomes more favorable (-1.95 in 3A-o 
versus -2.57 in 5N-o). Thus the evidence on the second conditional prediction is mixed. 
 
6.   Discussion 
Second and third generation models raise as many questions as they answer. What governs the timing of 
speculative attacks? What factors make attacks more or less frequent, and more or less likely to succeed? 
The models, and the available field evidence, are either silent or inconsistent on these important matters. 
The few existing laboratory studies use a simplified one-time, simultaneous-move setting that doesn’t 
capture the dynamic nature of currency speculation. 
Our laboratory experiment allows speculators to switch in and out of attack mode and lets the 
strength of fundamentals change in real time. It controls explanatory variables and so their impact on 
performance has a causal interpretation. Thus the experiment provides direct evidence on the models’ 






The main results of the experiment can be summarized as follows. 
1. Fundamentals. The probability of a successful attack indeed is a decreasing function of the strength of 
the fundamentals. The function appears to be continuous, not a jump from 0 to 1 as in some models.  For 
example, a deterioration of the fundamentals from 90 to 80 (percent of potential speculation required to 
force a devaluation) doubles the probability of a successful attack in our data. 
2. Information. Successful attacks are more likely and come sooner when speculators have information 
about the strength of fundamentals and about the activities of other speculators. In our symmetric data, for 
example, providing precise public information about net speculative positions shortens the average time 
to devaluation by about 15%, and providing precise public information about the fundamentals has a very 
similar effect. The effects persist even with weaker fundamentals and with less precise information.  
3. Asymmetries. The mere presence of a speculator with larger mass (“Soros”) increases the probability of 
a successful attack and hastens its onset; e.g., the time to success decreases by almost 30%. Consistent 
with some theory, giving the large speculator increased size does not significantly strengthen his impact 
in our data. Contrary to some theory, giving him better information seems to have little impact, and in our 
experiment the large speculators tend to attack later than ordinary speculators. 
4. Coordination. Speculators are more likely to switch into (and less likely to switch out of) attack mode 
when they are nearer to being pivotal, e.g., when fundamentals are weaker or more speculators are already 
in attack mode. The effect is enhanced by information about fundamentals and speculative activity.  
Of course, the laboratory results should not be translated directly into policy recommendations, 
but they should sharpen subsequent theoretical and empirical research and thus improve policy indirectly. 
For example, part of result 3 seems inconsistent with surveys of foreign exchange dealers, who say that 
the two most important advantages possessed by large traders are a “large customer base” and “better 
information” about the market (Cheung and Wong, 2000; Cheung and Chinn, 2001; and Cheung, Chinn 
and Marsh, 2004).
9 Future empirical work, both laboratory and field, should resolve the inconsistency and 
point to appropriate policy.  
Another example is the second result that better information about fundamentals encourages 
speculative attacks and makes success more likely. As noted, this conclusion seems to contradict 
conventional wisdom, some theoretical models, and one piece of field data. In our experiment, the 
strength of fundamentals is, by design, independent of what information is available. The two variables 
might be correlated in field data. Indeed, the central bank might strategically increase or decrease the 
                                                 
9 Wei and Kim (1997) find a very weak association between big players’ position and the subsequent currency movement, and 






availability of information, and from a decrease speculators might infer that fundamentals are weak. If 
this strategic effect is sufficiently strong, it could account for the conventional result and its very different 
policy implications. One way to pursue the question is to conduct laboratory experiments with 
information controlled by a player in the role of a central bank. The baseline results of our completed 
experiment would allow clear inferences about the strategic effect. 
To conclude, experimental methods have made useful contributions to many theoretical and 
applied fields of economics in the last ten or twenty years, but have hardly touched international finance. 
We believe that the work reported here offers evidence that is complementary to both field studies and 
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